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New Public Financial Management in Malaysia 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Purpose - This study focuses on the effectiveness of New Public Financial Management 
(NPFM) in Malaysia. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper reviews the literature on the universality of 
NPFM, distinguishing between those arguing NPFM is universally applicable and those 
regarding it as situational. It then tests whether NPFM is appropriate outside western 
contexts, examining developments in the emerging country of Malaysia. Major surveys and 
in-depth interviews with senior managers in 131 government agencies explore perceptions 
about the effectiveness of NPFM. 
Findings – Although technical, socio-political and behavioral issues do arise, we find 
empirical support for a universalist thesis that NPFM is appropriate in this emerging context. 
Research limitations/implications – All limitations of qualitative research apply. Findings  
may not be transferable to other emerging contexts.  
Practical implications – Practitioners should ensure sufficient resources to train managers in 
new methods and interpreting information. A participative culture may reduce gaming 
behavior, as may measuring the results of activities rather than provision, and rewarding 
managers for savings. Implementation success depends on parliamentary will to honour 
appropriate and timely allocations and on the executive to oversee and monitor the process 
effectively. 
Originality/value – The study provides rare empirical evidence on the universalist debate in 
emerging countries; with no previous substantive studies existing of NPFM in Malaysia. It 
also challenges conventional wisdom on institutional voids, socio-cultural differences and 
competitive market environments, indicating NPFM may be appropriate in emerging 
contexts.  
Keywords  New Public Financial Management; New Public Management; Government 
agencies; International/comparative Issues; Emerging countries; Malaysia 
Paper type Research paper. 
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New Public Financial Management in Malaysia 
 
 
                        Introduction 
 
This study focuses on financial and accounting reforms in government agencies in Malaysia 
and responds to calls for more contextualized empirical studies of public services in emerging 
countries (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). It links the universality of management and New 
Public Financial Management (NPFM) literatures. NPFM (Boston, 1993) is often seen as the 
underlying mechanism in public sector reforms worldwide (Guthrie et al., 1999; Lapsley, 
2000). As part of the literature on New Public Management (NPM) (Pollitt, 1990; Hood, 
1995; Lane, 2000) or ‘Third Way modernization’ (Llewellyn and Northcott, 2005), NPFM 
concerns accounting and financial management reforms aiming to improve the effectiveness 
and accountability of government through such means as accrual accounts, devolved budgets, 
performance measurement, transparent costing and output-based budgeting (Olson et al., 
2001). 
The processes and outputs of NPFM are driven by providing financial knowledge for more 
responsible, decentralized, equitable and transparent decision-making in government 
(Romzek, 2000). The aim is to ensure better public service delivery for the taxpayer: a central 
public concern. More timely and relevant knowledge can help reduce bureaucracy and ease 
the complexity of public decision making. It may improve procurement and pricing decisions, 
budget preparation, planning, customer orientation, accountability and expenditure control. It 
may also encourage line managers to commit to clear quantity and quality performance 
targets (Verbeeten, 2008), with fewer errors and more effective use of information 
technology (Boston, 1993; Guthrie et al., 1999). 
Although successfully applied in many western contexts (Guthrie et al., 1999), the case 
against attempting such reforms appears stronger in emerging countries, where scholars 
identify substantively different constraints posed by underdevelopment. These include a lack 
of supporting market mechanisms, transport and communication deficiencies, politico-
economic instability, and inadequate organizational structures, systems and competencies 
(Warrington, 1997; Batley, 1999). Such views are increasingly salient but lack large-scale 
empirical studies. In fact, Broadbent and Guthrie (2008) argue “it remains rare to find [public 
sector accounting] work related to emerging economies” in any of the top eight accounting 
journals (pp. 143), indicating this study addresses an important gap in the literature. The 
result is that theorists tend towards one of two polar-opposite assumptions: that NPFM is 
appropriate everywhere, notwithstanding implementation issues; or that structural and other 
constraints make it inappropriate for emerging contexts. This is part of a more general debate 
as to whether accounting is a global or local discipline (Lukka and Kasanen, 1996).  
We aim to confirm whether either of these views is supported by analyzing the 
appropriateness and impact of reforms in an emerging country. After reviewing the literature 
on universalism and NPFM, we focus on Malaysia because it has been at the forefront of 
NPFM reforms in emerging countries (World Bank, 2000) and we are aware of no other 
large-scale empirical study here. After outlining NPFM developments in Malaysia, we 
provide insights on its implementation through multi-agency questionnaire surveys and in-
depth interviews with top government officials. We conclude by examining the evidence for 
the applicability of NPFM in this emerging context. 
 
NPFM in developed and emerging nations 
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Malaysia is one of 51 emerging market economies experiencing a rapid pace of economic 
development and adopting government policies of economic liberalization (Arnold and 
Quelch, 1998). Others add 13 Central and Eastern European transition countries to this list, to 
include those undergoing similar development but restructuring from state-planned 
economies; and distinguish emerging countries from developing countries, whose per capita 
incomes and  growth rates are markedly lower and not moving substantively towards free 
market models (Hoskisson et al., 2000). We are not concerned with developing countries 
here. As in the more economically developed world, public sector financial reforms in 
emerging contexts aim to promote socio-economic development and administrative 
efficiency (Leemans, 1976). At the heart of NPFM reforms is evidence-based decision 
making resulting from the linking of previously unconnected domains of organizational 
knowledge. For example, budgetary decentralisation or delegation is said to integrate 
financial and management accounting systems and economic-based information sets to 
promote a more holistic approach to budgeting (ter Bogt and van Helden, 2000). 
Some take it for granted that a performance oriented management style encourages 
participation, flexibility, teamwork, problem-solving and equity if aligned to organizational 
and social forces (Ferlie et al., 1996). NPFM reforms are believed to mean better value for 
money, improved accountability, and enhanced expenditure control (Boston, 1993); and 
enhanced accounting practice through commercial pricing, cash management and provision 
processes (Guthrie et al., 1999). Implicit is the assumption that private sector management 
techniques and models are generally superior to traditional public administration approaches - 
although technical and socio-political problems may complicate the adoption process (Ferlie 
et al., 1996; Olson et al., 2001; Lewis and Stiles, 2004). This is because accounting 
information is not a neutral resource but based on choices subject to interpretation and 
influence (Caplan, 1971; Merchant and Shields, 1993). Creating useful accounting 
knowledge is challenging where there is uncertainty and ambiguity in its collation, 
interpretation and implementation. For example, it is difficult to identify the main drivers in 
activity-based costing systems (Mitchell, 1996). Institutional and government goals may not 
always be in alignment (Stiles, 2002) and the cross-subsidization of institutional activities is 
common because many public services are seen as merit goods: provided for normative 
reasons rather than purely commercial profit (Lewis and Stiles, 2004). Pragmatism in the 
budgetary process may also be compounded by the exercise of power within the institution. 
Where responsibility for allocating resources and monitoring performance is concentrated in 
limited hands and the process is dominated by non-finance professionals, political élites and 
coalitions may enforce their own agendas rather than a commercial budgeting model 
(Verbeeten, 2008; Donnithorne, 1991).  
Such issues are problematic but generally not intractable in the economically developed 
world, as the widespread adoption of NPFM attests. Verbeeten (2008), for example, argues 
behavioral effects in the Netherlands mediate effectiveness of reforms, but defining clear and 
measurable goals is positively associated with quantity and quality performance. Mir and 
Rahaman (2007) note that despite initial cultural fragmentation resulting from identity 
clashes between new accounting technologies and old bureaucratic procedures, an Australian 
government agency successfully transformed itself into a more business-oriented model. In 
the UK, medical practitioners initially resisted reforms on secondary care purchasing rights, 
but  eventually helped develop primary care groups/ trusts to oversee funding reforms 
(Broadbent, Jacobs and Laughlin, 2001). Of course, we should be wary of assuming a link 
between reforms and improved performance everywhere without evidence. Such universalist 
assumptions (Lubatkin et al., 1997) assume ‘western’ management models are valid in all 
contexts. They may be well-founded, but if unchallenged encourage the wholesale transfer of 
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off-the-peg NPFM concepts and techniques from one context to another without considering 
their appropriateness or form.  
We also observe the opposite assumption: NPFM is inappropriate for non-western 
countries. Some argue a convergence thesis, using evidence to suggest that globalization is 
impacting in similar ways worldwide (Barrett et al., 2005). These studies argue that emerging 
countries will eventually face a similar situation as developed nations, but currently face 
intractable problems (Berg and Whitaker, 1986). A more extreme view is that emerging 
contexts are unlikely to ever adopt western-derived models successfully. This situationist 
thesis (Campbell et al., 1970) assumes that implementation problems remain unassailable 
because of entrenched lower levels of public management capacity, market development, 
resources, political inclusivity, legal effectiveness and environmental stability (Batley, 1999). 
This implies that accounting is a local rather than a global discipline because of institutional 
barriers to the knowledge production process (Lukka and Kasanen, 1996). 
The international business literature sees ‘institutional voids’ in emerging contexts lacking 
basic banking, finance and intermediary support structures for business and individuals. 
Legal contracts and property rights are difficult to enforce, a massive informal economy 
dominates, and there is scant provision of goods and services to substantial poor sectors of 
the population (Lubatkin et al., 1997; London and Hart, 2004; Ricart et al., 2004). Although 
institutional void theories developed from private enterprise, a similar argument applies in 
welfare, health, education and other public services. The lack of centralised financial and 
contract management structures may create budgetary control difficulties and promote a 
compliance culture (Common, 1998; Manning, 2001). A lack of trained accountants means 
managers have insufficient knowledge or skills to make financial decisions (Rahaman, 2001). 
Significant public-private sector pay gaps make recruitment and retention of qualified staff 
difficult; performance based pay is a problem when seniority structures dominate promotion; 
unreliable information systems enhance uncertainty (Larbi, 2001; McCourt, 2001); and a lack 
of funding inhibits reforms (Bissessar, 2002).  
Socio-political factors are also believed to obstruct NPFM in emerging countries. Culture 
and ethnicity influences personnel and behavioral controls, budget participation, and reward 
systems (Efferin and Hopper, 2007); national origin of corporate ownership affects corporate 
social responsibility and reporting (Teoh and Thong, 1984); while nationalism constructs 
managerial identities and political decision processes (Cooper et al., 1998). In the public 
sector, political constraints can slow transition from state-owned enterprises towards more 
efficient forms (O’Connor et al., 2006); and lower general expectations of service quality 
combine with centralised, authoritarian, conflicting and inconsistent allocation policies 
(Larbi, 2001). Even if government support is initially forthcoming, a lack of sustained 
political will can fail to maintain pressure on recalcitrants to continue accounting reforms 
(Wilenski, 1986). Fundamental differences between NPFM rationales, civil service cultures 
and societal patterns of values and authority may mean reforms fail to root. Extended family 
and ethnic loyalties, corruption, and alternative values create resistance to reforms from 
‘alien’ frames of reference (Caiden, 1991; McCourt, 2001).   
Generalisations about reforms are problematic, because organization, industry and country-
specific factors cause NPFM to vary in form rather than follow uniform global concepts and 
techniques (Guthrie et al., 1999); but it may be equally misleading to argue they are largely 
ineffective. In developed countries studies have emphasised the positive and negative effects 
of reforms. For example, managers have been tempted to deliver what is easily measurable 
rather than what is important in achieving policy objectives (Mellett, 1998); or take a myopic 
view of costs, failing to link these to revenues or wider socio-economic concerns (Lewis and 
6 
Stiles, 2004). Reforms may be questioned in democratic terms, with decisions falling into the 
hands of unelected managers and accountants (Guthrie et al., 1999). Implementation costs 
incurred through changes in work methods, information systems, staff training and 
recruitment may reduce the financial benefits of reforms, while cost-effectiveness 
considerations can mean fewer public services provided at higher unit costs (Olson et al., 
2001). 
However, emerging countries have attempted to implement NPFM reforms, including 
decentralisation of decision-making, the introduction of financial management systems, and 
an emphasis on output and performance standards (Collins, 1993; Minogue et al., 1998; 
Manning, 2001). This includes countries in Eastern Europe (Cooper et al., 1998), Latin 
America (Neu et al.,  2006) and China (Hao, 1999; O’Connor et al., 2006). Such studies are 
rare (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008) and although generally report positive contributions to 
public service performance (Grindle, 1997; Larbi, 2001), seldom consider the mediating 
effect of institutional voids and wider social factors. We therefore attempt a more balanced 
approach in critically examining universalist, convergence and situationist theses in relation 
to Malaysian government reforms. Those few published studies on Malaysia focus on 
individual reform programs (Gnaneswari, 1993; Xavier, 1996). We instead take a broad focus 
on post-1990 NPFM initiatives and examine empirical evidence on the appropriateness and 
impact of reforms. After outlining the nature of Malaysian NPFM, we present a research 
design followed by results and conclusions from an extensive empirical study on public 
finance reforms in Malaysia. 
 
The Malaysian context 
In Malaysia, Ministries are the highest forms of central government organization and 
Departments and Statutory Bodies constitute the portfolios of each parent Ministry. 
Departments are the oldest forms of government organization, inherited from British colonial 
administration and classified as Ministries’ national level financial responsibility centres 
(Xavier, 1996). Each Statutory Body is established by a specific Parliamentary Act and 
governed by a Board of Directors appointed by its parent Minister. The Board is responsible 
for the overall running of the organization and consists of senior civil servants from various 
Ministries and agencies. Statutory Bodies have greater financial and managerial autonomy 
than Departments (Othman, 2001) and Ministries (Chiu, 1997), with Controlling Officers 
accountable to the Cabinet via the Public Account Committee. Controlling Officers are 
usually Chief Secretaries of Ministries, Heads of Departments and Board members of 
Statutory Bodies (Malaysian Treasury, 2001).  
Reforms were prompted by increasingly limited resources and proliferating demands upon 
public expenditure in the 1990s (Taib and Mat, 1992; Malaysian Government, 2000). A 
critical Auditor General’s Report highlighted the need for attitude change among civil 
servants centring on value for money accountability and active participation in financial 
management. The then Malaysian Secretary General, Tan Sri Ahmad Sarji bin Abdul Hamid, 
suggested line managers be given greater autonomy in decision making, while changes in 
organizational structures and responsibilities shift accountability from task and process 
orientation towards delivery of services (Abdul Hamid, 1995). Reforms were introduced 
principally through the Modified Budgeting System, the Micro Accounting System and a new 
internal auditing system. These initiatives represent a distinct Malaysian approach, but echo 
central themes of NPFM reforms in the developed world: replacing traditional bureaucratic 
models with greater decentralization of decision making (Romzek, 2000; Hyndman and 
Eden, 2001); private sector accounting, management and budgeting techniques (Pollitt and 
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Bouckaert, 2000); and systematic use of information technology (Pollitt, 1990) to improve 
decision processes and ensure greater accountability. 
 
Modified Budgeting System 
In 1997 the Modified Budgeting System (MBS) was implemented in Statutory Bodies 
receiving operating allocations from the Treasury (Malaysian Treasury, 1996). MBS was 
developed to remedy weaknesses in the Programme and Performance Budgeting System 
(PPBS) in place since 1969 (in other countries the acronym refers to Planning Programming 
and Budgeting System, influential globally since the 1960s), Malaysia’s PPBS had tried to 
plan expenditure primarily through output categories (programs) (Robinson, 2000). However, 
PPBS focused on line items instead of results and performance measures. It also limited top 
management autonomy in decision-making, discouraging participation; intensified the 
dichotomy between financial management and operating matters, and encouraged gaming by 
spending organizations rather than achieving value for money (Gnaneswari, 1993; 
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1995). MBS instead emphasizes spending limits, delegating 
budget authority to operating managers, and output based performance measurement (Xavier, 
1996) - key components of NPFM reforms worldwide (Pallot, 1999). 
MBS comprises expenditure targets, program agreement and exception reporting, a cycle of 
program evaluations and a generalised approach to expenditure control (Malaysian Treasury, 
1988; Gnaneswari, 1993; Xavier, 1996). It centres on accounting-based knowledge informing 
management decision making in general. The expenditure target (ET) is a budget ceiling for 
an on-going program, with Controlling Officers given the freedom to suggest allocation of 
ETs to programs and activities they consider will achieve the best possible performance 
consistent with government policies (Malaysian Treasury, 1988). ETs are similar to the Cash 
Limit regime implemented in the UK in 1974/75 to discipline civil servants from 
overspending on original estimates (Henly, 1989). Additional Treasury funds can only be 
obtained for expenditures specially allocated by new legislation during the budget period, 
thereby tightening spending control. An Exception Report (ER) is generated where 
Controlling Officers fail to achieve agreed targets within the accepted variance. Government 
organizations are also encouraged to make savings proposals, keeping a proportion of savings 
made. If saving proposals are made by the Treasury, agencies lose all savings.  
MBS is widely known as the ‘let managers manage’ policy because it delegates greater 
budget autonomy to operating managers in the hope of securing cost savings and links 
financial resources and outputs by using previously unavailable accounting knowledge 
(Bujang, 1996; Xavier, 1996). In practice this means the delegation of financial autonomy 
and flexibility from the Controlling Officer to line managers (Malaysian Treasury, 1988; 
Xavier, 1996). The Treasury also introduced Programme Agreements: performance contracts 
between Controlling Officers and the Treasury, with output and outcome performance targets 
consistent with NPFM contract management internationally (OECD, 1995; Malaysian 
Treasury, 2001). Implementation of MBS requires fundamental reviews of programs and 
activities at least once every five years in relation to overall objectives of improving resource 
allocation and accountability (Xavier, 1996).  
 
Micro Accounting System  
Introduced in 1992, the Micro Accounting System (MAS) is an output costing package 
(PMD, 1992b) designed to increase cost awareness among civil servants and improve value 
for money management accounting (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1995). The aim was for 
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managers to plan, implement, monitor and evaluate activities and programs to ensure 
effective use of public funds and the meeting of Programme Agreements. Managers would be 
able to compute all relevant costs of outputs, including capital asset utilisation costs (i.e. 
depreciation charges) (PMD, 1992). In 2000, a special division was established in the 
Accountant General’s Department to organise and monitor MAS implementation and develop 
supporting computer systems. 
 
Internal Auditing System 
An internal auditing system was first introduced in 1979, with auditors responsible for the 
independent and regular observation of organizational activities. In 1993 the government 
decided to strengthen accountability and achieve greater value for money (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1995) by upgrading the system where an internal auditing unit already existed 
and establishing units in remaining organizations to improve auditing knowledge (Abdul 
Hamid, 1995). Circulars were issued on specific items of accountability and expenditure 
control and a Financial and Account Management Committee established to oversee the 
auditing process in each organization. Each committee includes the Chief Executive, Internal 
Audit Director and accountants and is responsible for checking compliance with financial 
procedures, updating accounts, issuing purchase tenders and monitoring actions in response to the 
Auditor General’s comments. 
Government literature on all three initiatives shows common aims. These are to foster 
positive staff attitudes towards customer satisfaction, innovation, accountability and 
professionalism; enable clear lines of responsibility within each agency; improve the process 
of accountability within agencies and with parent Ministries; increase value for money 
(VFM) awareness among managers; improve the quality of accounting knowledge; and 
enhance strategic and operational planning (Abdul Hamid, 1995; Malaysian Government, 
2000; Malaysian Treasury, 2001). Government sources claim successes in all these areas, but 
it is important to test such claims to determine the extent of NPFM’s universalism. 
Senior managers’ perceptions should therefore support the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. The overall perceived impact of financial reforms is positive in 
improving each of the following areas:  
1a. Attitudes of staff in terms of customer orientation, innovation, accountability and 
professionalism;  
1b. Lines of responsibility within the agency;   
1c. The process of accountability within the agency;  
1d. The process of accountability between the agency and its parent ministry;  
1e. Value for money (VFM) awareness;  
1f. The quality of accounting knowledge;  
1g. Strategic planning;  
1h. Operational planning. 
 
 
Support for a situationist thesis would mean little or no perceived organizational impact in 
any of the areas; while success in a few areas would be seen to evidence a limited 
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convergence argument. A positive impact in all or most of the areas would support a 
universalist view. The universalist position would also be strengthened if all three NPFM 
initiatives were examined separately and regarded as successful; whereas negative 
associations for one or more reform may support a situationist or convergence stance:  
Proposition 2. The perceived impact of a) the Modified Budgeting System, b) the 
Micro Accounting System, and c) the new internal auditing system is positive in all 
areas of proposition 1. 
  
The accounting literature also shows higher quality accounting knowledge is useful in 
competitive, financially constrained environments, particularly for government agencies more 
affected by market forces (ter Bogt and van Helden, 2000). Reforms should therefore have 
greater impact on Malaysian agencies in more competitive environments. Support for 
propositions 3 and 4 below would indicate a universalist stance, while evidence to the 
contrary would indicate a convergence or situationist view: 
Proposition 3. The perceived impact of NPFM reforms is positive for a) Statutory 
Bodies, b) Departments and c) Ministries in all areas of proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 4. The perceived impact of NPFM reforms is greater in more 
competitive external environments in all areas of proposition 1.  
  
There may be additional technical, behavioral and contextual issues that are particular to 
the Malaysian context and would lend support to a stronger situationist thesis if widespread 
and intractable, or a weaker convergence thesis if limited in impact. In-depth interviews 
would help identify these and probe beneath survey data to more fully explore the attitudes of 
senior policy implementers.  We now outline the design to operationalize these propositions 
and determine the degree to which NPFM reforms have been successful in Malaysia.  
 
Research design 
Malaysia was considered an appropriate context because the financial reforms of the 1990s 
had been in place for more than 5 years – long enough to determine their effects (ter Bogt, 
2000). The main aim was to see whether reforms had led to significant improvements in the 
areas claimed by government. A total of 131 organizations were selected, representing the 
entire population of qualifying organizations, comprising 24 Ministries, 72 Departments and 
35 Statutory Bodies. Wholly owned and subsidiary companies of Statutory Bodies were 
excluded since they were not legally bound to implement reforms. Post-1990 organizations 
were not included because of limited reform experience, unless they were pre-1990 
organizations merging, such as the Malaysian Rubber Board; or changing status, such as the 
Inland Revenue changing from a Department into a Statutory Body. Academic institutions 
and hospitals were excluded because of their special nature. 
We focused on the perceptions of senior managers because they were best placed to make 
overall judgements on the impact of reforms. This key informant data collection strategy is 
common in management research (Slater et al., 2007) where a strategic overview is required. 
Of course, some senior managers may be biased because of vested interests in the success of 
reforms, exaggerating their effectiveness to curry political favour or enhance their 
management capabilities. Such senior administrators may share “the world view of the 
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technobureaucracy” as part of a universalist legitimating ideology for NPFM (Rizzi, 1985). 
However, it is equally possible that managers may exaggerate the ineffectiveness of reforms 
to protect their organizations further from what they regard as excessive interference and 
enforced change (Pollitt, 1990). We attempted to minimise both potential biases by 
broadening the survey to all relevant institutions and triangulating survey findings with 
follow-up in-depth interview data from senior managers and line managers in a random set of 
organizations. 
Following a pilot exercise in 5 organizations, the questionnaire survey was administered to 
the named Chief Secretary for each Ministry, Director General for each Department and 
Chief Executive/ General Manager for each Statutory Body. On a scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), respondents indicated the effect of overall and 
particular financial management reforms on the areas specified in the first and second 
propositions. Data were collected on organizational type to test the third proposition. 
Respondents were asked whether they considered their external environments mainly-, 
partially- or non-competitive to test proposition 4. Mann-Whitney and Kruskal Wallis 
association tests were conducted as appropriate. The number of employees and operating 
expenditure of each organization provided further profiling variables, as did expectations on 
whether organizations would be privatised, but these were not expected to influence reforms.  
We recognised the risk of low response rate in emerging countries because of cultural, 
structural and logistical barriers to research (Lubatkin et al., 1997; Hoskisson et al., 2000), by 
administering questionnaires by hand. This was possible because organizations were 
concentrated in Kuala Lumpur and a neighbouring city, Putrajaya. In a small number of 
distant cases, questionnaires were mailed out. This strategy proved successful, with 94 
responses and a usable response rate of 72% - higher than many postal surveys. Of usable 
responses, 14 (58%) were from Ministries, 55(76%) from Departments and 25 (71%) from 
Statutory Bodies.  Table I profiles respondents by job status and organizational type, 
confirming their seniority. Over 90% had over 15 years’ civil service experience, with an 
average 23 years. Most had experience of providing government services before and after 
reforms. 
[Take in Table I about here] 
 
A second phase of in-depth semi-structured interviews involved 36 respondents from 20 
organizations randomly sampled from the general survey. This occurred 6-9 months after the 
survey and included top managers and line managers to provide different perspectives. 
Interviews clarified responses from the survey, compared participants’ detailed accounts of 
NPFM implementation for each reform initiative, and highlighted consistencies and 
inconsistencies not evident in the survey (King, 2004). Wherever possible, we interviewed 
more than one manager in the same organization (9 each for Departments and Statutory 
Bodies, and 2 Ministries). Departments and Statutory Bodies represented different size bands: 
5 large, 10 medium, and 3 small. Five organizations (1 Department and 4 Statutory Bodies) 
were drawn from the same parent Ministry to provide comparative data on common 
initiatives and parent-agency relationships. Interviews were taped, manually coded and 
thematically analyzed across variables and within cases using data display matrices to 
compare and contrast patterns of responses (Boyatzis, 1998). A brief supplementary 
questionnaire was also issued to senior officers in two ministries, again distributed and 
collected by hand. This contained key questions from the original survey to check the validity 
of responses. It also included new items to probe for detailed perceptions of changes in 
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Treasury control and achieved an acceptable response rate of 43% (17 questionnaires) given 
that it was a follow-up instrument.  
 
Results and analysis 
First Phase: Questionnaire Survey 
Table II shows the perceived impact of reforms in all areas of proposition 1, ranked by mean 
score. With scores of at least 3.91, overall impact was seen as positive and substantive in all 
areas, supporting the first proposition. Accountability issues ranked first and joint third, with 
93% of the respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing accountability had improved within 
Malaysian government organizations, and 88% believing accountability had improved 
between agencies and parent Ministries.  
[Take in Table II about here] 
 
Improvements in the quality of accounting information ranked second, with a mean score 
of 4.18 and 89% of respondents indicating agreement or strong agreement. Improvements in 
operational planning ranked joint third, followed by clarifying internal lines of responsibility, 
improving strategic planning, increasing Value for Money (VFM) awareness, and improving 
attitudes of staff. Managers believed they now had better structures, roles and systems in 
place for operational and strategic decision making. Increased VFM awareness suggested that 
managers were more scrupulous in putting public resources to better use; while reforms had 
also improved overall attitudes concerning customer satisfaction, innovation, accountability 
and professionalism. Almost all (96%) of Statutory Body respondents and 80% of those from 
Departments claimed to have internal auditing systems following reforms. 
As expected, organizational size in terms of employees and operating expenditure, and 
anticipated possible privatization were not associated with differences in the perceived 
impact of reforms. Table III shows that the impact of each reform program was seen as 
positive, supporting proposition 2. Although MAS was felt less important than MBS and the 
internal auditing system, differences were not statistically significant. Therefore the 
convergence/situationist thesis did not gain support at this stage.  
[Take in Table III about here] 
 
Some claim before reforms Statutory Bodies were generally the most financially 
independent (Othman, 2001). Reforms could therefore be expected to have greater impact in 
changing more traditional Departments and Ministries, since these experience greater 
exposure to market forces once bureaucratic budgeting and finance systems are removed. 
However, there was little evidence that this was the case. Table IV collapses likert responses 
into three categories and shows positive impacts for all types of organization. There were also 
no statistically significant differences between Ministries, Statutory Bodies and Departments 
over the impact of reforms, indicating support for universalist Proposition 3.  
[Take in Table IV about here] 
 
Table V shows respondents felt NPFM had a positive impact on organizations facing all 
types of competitive environment, but reforms were not more significant for organizations 
facing highly competitive environments and proposition 4 was therefore unsupported. Mann-
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Whitney tests showed most respondents (76 %) from Statutory Bodies felt their external 
environments to be mainly or partially competitive, compared with only 42% of those from 
Departments (significant at p=0.02). In Departments, 58% felt their environments were non-
competitive. However, differences in the impact of reforms were not significantly associated 
with varying levels of perceived environmental competition, either between Departments and 
Statutory Bodies or within each category.  
[Take in Table V about here] 
 
This appears to contradict the literature that NPFM reforms will be felt more in government 
agencies affected by market forces (ter Bogt and van Helden, 2000). This may indicate 
variation in impact by competitive environment is not a universal phenomenon, challenging 
previous research. Conversely, it may mean that NPFM reforms have been so far-reaching 
that any market-oriented differentials are small. Further research needs to be conducted to 
confirm whether either view prevails. Generally, survey perceptions lend strong support to 
official accounts of the impact and effectiveness of NPFM in Malaysia – and to the 
universalist thesis. The follow-up survey double-checked results, while face-to-face 
interviews explored issues in-depth.  
Second Phase: In-depth Interviews and Follow-up Survey  
This phase confirmed the first proposition that financial reforms had generally positive impacts, 
strengthening support for the universalist thesis. It also confirmed Proposition 2 that all initiatives 
were influential, but interviews provided stronger support than the initial survey for differences in 
impact between the three programmes. MBS was regarded as the most significant reform - 
particularly in terms of improving operational accountability, financial management and value for 
money awareness. One observer predicted an internal auditing system would fail because of a 
lack of qualified auditing personnel, a high turnover of auditors, and a lack of top 
management motivation (Othman, 2001). Although these did impact, the new internal auditing 
system was generally felt effective by those implementing it. However, it had only been 
implemented by a minority of interviewees and most felt it had limited value in increasing VFM 
awareness. Again, organizational type and competitive environment appeared to have little impact 
on the efficacy of reforms. Technical, behavioral and contextual difficulties arose in the course of 
implementation, but these were not dissimilar to those observed in western contexts. Interviews 
supported the overall survey conclusion that NPFM offers universal benefits in improving the 
process and outputs of government agencies. It is impossible to provide full details of every aspect 
emerging during the interviews, so we discuss general findings under four broad headings relating 
to the main survey. 
 
Operational accountability  
This includes accountability, responsibility, general attitudes and operational planning within 
agencies; and accountability between agencies and parent ministries. Most (75 %) of follow-
up senior Ministry survey respondents confirmed phase one findings that these items had 
improved after reforms. Of these, 70% attributed success to the impact of MBS. Interviews 
confirmed the 'Let managers manage' policy allowed managers to allocate resources based 
on local operational priorities, reduced bureaucracy, created responsibility centres, and 
encouraged procurement autonomy. According to a Statutory Body line manager: 
 “It saves time and we get exactly what we expect. If we want to make a purchase, we 
obtain the quotation directly from the selected suppliers nowadays. We don’t rely on 
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the financial people only. Before, they did it for us and it was slow and the purchases 
made did not follow the specifications determined by us”. 
 
MBS also improved budget preparation, with Expenditure Targets (ETs) reducing 'gaming' 
by using budget proposals as annual planning documents. The discretionary power of Treasury 
officers to cut budget requests was reduced and top/line managers felt more involved in 
budgeting because of its customer-oriented focus. Additional allocations from the Treasury for 
approved activities were generally no longer needed. MBS shifted budgetary control from 
financial division officials to line managers, which improved attitudes towards spending within 
limits and meant more management control over internal budget allocation, procurement and 
virement (the transfer of monies from one account to another). Accountability and expenditure 
control were also enhanced by MBS and the new internal auditing system, both within 
organizations and in dealings with parent Ministries; while 77 % of Departmental interviewees 
in the follow-up survey established internal auditors. The remainder were subject to scrutiny by 
parent Ministry auditors. The new Financial and Account Management Committees met at least 
once a quarter in every organization and were instrumental in enforcing internal audit, as one line 
manager remarked: 
“Our internal auditors are very active in checking on whether our works are following 
procedures, and whether payments are made correctly. Furthermore, they go on to check 
our customers’ satisfaction. They do it randomly. Beside internal auditors, we also have 
an internal audit committee that addresses the issues raised by the internal auditors. We 
are very transparent”.  
 
A minority of interviewees believed that financial autonomy was still inadequate, since 
managers had to follow detailed Treasury procedures; and parent Ministries downplayed 
performance information during budget reviews. These factors contributed to the delay in 
Departments receiving budget allocations, heightened by managers being forced to await 
Treasury warrants even after official approval, or be personally liable for a surcharge if warrants 
failed to arrive. A small number of Departmental officials also felt delegation was bound to be 
temporary, with the Treasury able to revoke autonomy as the need arose. These believed MBS 
failed to improve budget carry forward, while lack of funds led government organizations to 
scale down or delay planned activities. Improvements in accountability depended on managers’ 
initiative to take advantage of the new systems, with Treasury monitoring less effective in some 
instances and managerial resistance compounded by few promotion sanctions for non-
compliance.  
 
Quality of accounting knowledge  
Performance contracts encouraged line managers to commit to clear performance targets. 
Generally, the role of parent Ministries in target setting and monitoring was now considered 
advisory only and managers were able to apply new financial and non-financial performance 
indicators including those related to quantity, quality and unit costs. MBS also improved the 
quality and detail of accounting knowledge in responsibility centres’ expenditure reports, with 
fewer errors and greater timeliness, especially with the introduction of computer technology. 
Typical of responses was this from a Statutory Body Planning Director:  
“Even before the MBS we had our performance targets for our main activities. But the 
MBS improved the practice by introducing additional targets that we need to achieve for 
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the activity. The MBS made the practice more systematic as targets include quality, 
timeliness and costs”. 
 
A minority reported problems with MBS. Attempts to emphasize results-based targets were 
moderated by some managers' resistance to change and inherent difficulty in measuring output 
based performance indicators. Information only became actionable knowledge when it was 
both accepted and implemented. A lack of Treasury advice and monitoring meant some 
managers did not believe performance targets were important, especially where there was a lack 
of funds and expertise to assess outcomes. This meant managers continued to unnecessarily 
exhaust budget allocations, relied on process rather than results based indicators, and were 
reluctant to undertake performance program evaluation. Improvements in expenditure reports 
were limited by a lack of budget profiling information and Ministries and Departments 
continued to use cash basis accounting data. Some managers compensated for this by keeping 
their own records of liabilities and future commitments. Others criticised performance 
information from Treasury Budget Review Officers (BROs) as unreliable because it was not 
attested by any independent body (i.e. the National Audit Department): 
“Every time we prepare the output performance targets and exception reports, 
whatever we report, the monitoring is not enforced at the Treasury level. We are not 
properly advised about whether what we measured is right or wrong”. 
 
Strategic Planning  
Greater delegation in strategic planning occurred from parent Ministries to Departments, with 
greater actionable knowledge developed in terms of formulating and implementing strategy. This 
was attributed to greater government commitment in reducing bureaucracy and improving 
service delivery rather than specific reforms. Priority setting was believed to be the 
responsibility of top management. Departmental strategies began as interactive efforts with 
parent Ministries, since supervisory consent was required. In Statutory Bodies the Board of 
Directors approved strategy, with guidelines from Ministries, the Secretary General’s Office 
and the Treasury helping to establish a strategic framework and implementation in the hands of 
each Body. As one Deputy Director General commented: 
“The Ministry only leads us in general policy, but implementation is our responsibility. 
New projects and ideas are from our Departments. Generally, our planning and 
activities are dependent on us. The Ministry’s role is for endorsement. Our suggestions 
will be accepted as long as our plan is in line with the broad policies of the Ministry”. 
 
Ministries sometimes went beyond this supervisory role where the main activities of 
Bodies had an important bearing on their strategies. In such cases, a parent Ministry would 
actively defend the intent of the Statutory Body during Treasury budget review. 
 
Value for Money (VFM) awareness 
Most (82%) of follow-up survey respondents believed reforms had increased VFM awareness, 
with 70% attributing this to MBS. Interviews confirmed Treasury control over voted activities 
was ensured by setting objectives at the beginning of each fiscal year, with additional allocations 
only after Parliamentary approval and generally only for emoluments (salaries, fees, etc.). 
Interviewees viewed virement unfavourably and tried to avoid it, since this was seen as poor 
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planning.  In procurement, managers did not always choose the lowest bid but balanced cost 
against quality and long-term impacts in a more informed judgement: 
“We should look at the long-term impact on the cost of operation. Most of the time, 
cheap products incur us higher maintenance costs afterwards. We should look at this 
factor as well as the purchase price consideration”. 
 
Such positives were partly offset by a behavior towards exhausting allocation; the absence of a 
results-based accountability system; and a weak MAS. However, as the literature earlier 
showed, these issues are not unique to emerging countries. The spend-what-you’re-given 
behavior resulted from managers’ desire to avoid under-spending or exceed their budget 
allocations because of the perceived threat of future cuts. Spending sprees were common at the 
year end, as one Statutory Body director noted:  
“We tend to encourage people to spend regardless of the impact of this spending. What 
should be happening is that if you don’t spend RM$5 million, the impact should be more 
than RM$5 million, but we don’t put emphasis on that. The emphasis is more on 
spending. That is why when December comes, we go Christmas shopping”. 
 
The absence of a results-based accountability system meant some respondents were not 
informed whether the money they spent generated the intended outputs. The only controls in 
place were Treasury procedures, felt to be inadequate in matching expenditure with results. 
Only 5 out of 14 organizations actually implementing MAS found the resulting cost 
information useful for decision making. Those who did believed information helped in 
pricing and efficiency considerations, with the cost of operations and the needs of customers 
more fully understood, and improved financial control by head offices over responsibility 
centres. Decisions concerning outsourcing were more informed by costing data, but some felt 
MAS was limited to easily quantifiable outputs and used to justify minor internal decisions 
such as purchasing fax machines to deliver government documents cheaply. Some managers 
felt they were not sufficiently involved in the design of the information process, despite their 
role as end-users. The lack of accountants and accounting expertise in the civil service was a 
more situationist implementation problem, with some Departments unable to recruit 
professional accountants or accounting degree holders. The costing process was perceived as 
difficult and tedious by non-accountants and staff training in MAS was complicated by 
frequent personnel rotation. Despite such issues, the general view was that NPFM had been 
successful in Malaysian government agencies. The intractable problems foreseen by the 
situationists had not materialized and implementation difficulties were not unlike those 
experienced in the West. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
This study provides evidence that NPFM can be fruitfully applied in an emerging context, 
challenging the situationist view that reforms are inappropriate where there are limited 
market mechanisms and politico-cultural difficulties. Top Malaysian managers believed 
reforms were largely successful in all areas, with no significant differences for organizational 
type or competitiveness of environment. This supports a universalist view, with 
improvements occurring in staff attitudes, managerial responsibility, accountability within 
agencies and between agencies and parent Ministries. There was greater VFM awareness, 
higher quality accounting information and improved planning.  
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As predicted, some conceptual and practical implementation issues were evident in 
technical, behavioral and political dimensions (Lewis and Stiles, 2004), but these were 
insufficient to derail attempts at reform. Interviews showed that MBS was the most 
successful of the three initiatives, with greater responsibility and autonomy for line managers 
leading to spending within limits and more effective budget allocation, procurement and 
virement. MAS was useful in pricing, financial control, efficiency and outsourcing 
considerations; although there have been implementation difficulties in terms of VFM 
awareness. Some problems were intensified because of shortages in accountancy personnel 
and knowledge. This may evidence a limited situationist view, but positive impacts were seen 
for all three initiatives. 
Other contextual issues included a prevalent budget exhaustion culture, inadequate 
performance monitoring by the Treasury and parent Ministries, and the reluctance to link 
financial management behavior to promotion systems. Yet these problems are not unique to 
emerging countries. Similar problems occur in developed countries, where reforms face 
difficulties in technical, behavioral and socio-political dimensions (Lewis and Stiles, 2004). 
Managerial resistance to reforms, gaming over budgeting preparation and control, focusing 
on process not output, and spending sprees at year end are observed in western contexts 
because of the uncertain nature of accounting data and the organizational context (Caplan, 
1971; Merchant and Shields, 1993). 
There are inevitable limitations in a study based on qualitative perceptions that may prompt 
future research. It is difficult to examine performance data directly because private sector 
measures such as profit or return-on-investment are largely irrelevant to public sector bodies, 
but some external verification of managers’ beliefs would be useful. Line managers did help 
triangulate findings, but a survey of frontline staff may check whether implementation 
difficulties arise managers are unaware of; while a survey of end-users may provide an 
additional perspective. However, the scale and breadth of the data here should provide some 
confidence that a systematic initial attempt has been made to explore the effects of NPFM in 
Malaysia. 
A second concern is that generalizations about emerging countries are premature because 
of the particular character of Malaysia. It was one of the first emerging nations to seriously 
implement NPFM reforms. Those countries lagging behind may be doing so because of more 
intractable contextual constraints. The definitions earlier see emerging countries as 
qualitatively different to developing countries, where economic problems may be more 
intractable. For example, in Ghana international debt repayments have locked government 
into a perpetual cycle of poverty and financial crisis, making reforms difficult (Rahaman et 
al., 2007). Despite received wisdom (Hoskisson et al., 2000), there may be emerging contexts 
where the public benefit more marginally from reforms because of poverty and corruption 
(McCourt, 2001). Long-standing economic patronage of Malaysia by the rich countries of 
Europe, America and Japan may also set Malaysia apart from post-Communist Asian 
countries. Malaysia shares a British colonial heritage with South Africa (Chua and Poullaos, 
2002) and developed a colonially-based local hybrid accounting system like South Africa and 
Kenya (Sian, 2006). It may therefore embed values more sympathetic to British-style 
accounting reforms – although in Brunei, another ex-British territory, the private sector 
accountancy profession has little impact on the public sector and ethnicity remains a potent 
influence (Yapa, 1999). In the Philippines, a traditionalist, familial culture competes for 
control over public accounting with a more rationalist/legal regulatory framework (Dyball 
and Valcarcel, 1999).  There is therefore a need to study NPFM reforms as they are 
implemented in each emerging country to further test universalist and situationist hypotheses. 
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A third area emerges directly from study findings. Previous research suggested NPFM 
reforms would have greater impact in government agencies exposed to more competitive 
market environments (ter Bogt and van Helden, 2000). This was not observed in Malaysia 
and may indicate that competitive environment is not a universal mediating factor. Further 
research should determine whether this is so in other contexts. 
Although technical, socio-political and behavioral problems are not be unique to emerging 
nations,  Malaysia has experienced some contextual constraints to implementing reforms 
relevant to all those contemplating NPFM . Practitioners must ensure there are sufficient 
resources to train managers in new financial methods and interpreting information, especially 
given shortages of accounting personnel. A participative culture involving managers in the 
design and implementation of systems may reduce gaming and other behaviors. Practitioners also 
need to challenge spend-all cultures by measuring the results of activities rather than provision, 
and rewarding organizations and individuals for savings rather than enforcing cut-backs in the 
following year’s budget. Policy makers should recognise that much depends on the will of national 
parliaments to authorise and honor appropriate and timely allocations and on government and 
executive branches to oversee and monitor the process effectively. Overall, the evidence suggests 
that while NPFM may encounter implementation difficulties, these are not intractable in an 
emerging context and do not deflect the quest for more informed public service delivery.   
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TABLE I 
 
Status of Respondents by Category of Employment 
 
 Departments Statutory Bodies Ministries Total 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Director General/ Chief 
Executives/Secretary General 10 18 1 4 2 14 13 14 
Deputy Director General 9 16 3 12 4 29 16 17 
Admin & Finance Directors 22 40 8 32 7 50 37 39 
Director Of Corporate/ Planning 6 11 4 16 1 7 10 11 
Senior General Managers 8 15 9 - - - 18 19 
Total 55 100 25 100 14 100 94 100 
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TABLE II 
 
Overall Impact of NPFM Reforms in Malaysia 
 Strongly Disagree Disagree Uncertain Agree 
Strongly 
Agree Overall 
Financial Management 
Reforms have: No % No % No % No % No % MEAN RANK
Improved the process of 
Accountability within the  
Agency 
- - 1 1 6 6 57 61 30 32 4.23 1 
Improved the quality of  
Accounting Information - -   11 12 55 59 28 30 4.18 2 
Improved the process of 
Accountability between the 
agency and the parent 
ministry 
- - 1 1 9 11 49 62 21 26 4.13 3 
Improved operational 
planning - - 1 1 12 13 55 58 26 28 4.13 3 
Enabled clear lines of 
Responsibility to be  
identified within the agency 
- - 2 2 13 14 55 58 24 26 4.07 4 
Improved strategic planning - - 1 1 15 16 56 60 22 23 4.05 5 
Increased the awareness of 
Value for Money amongst 
managers 
1 1 2 2 21 23 47 50 22 24 3.94 6 
Substantially improved the 
attitudes of staff - - 6 7 12 13 59 63 16 17 3.91 7 
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TABLE III 
 
Importance Attached to Each Reform Program 
 
 
 Very Unimportant Not Important Neutral Important Very Important Overall 
Reform Programs: No % No % No % No % No % MEAN RANK
Micro Accounting System 2 2 7 8 23 25 35 38 25 27 3.80 3 
Internal Audit System - - 2 2 8 9 24 27 56 62 4.49 1 
Modified Budgeting System - - - - 9 10 29 31 55 59 4.49 1 
29 
TABLE IV 
 
NPFM Reforms by Organizational Status 
 
 
 Departments (N= 55) Statutory Bodies (N= 25) Ministries(14) 
Reform programs have: 
Disagree
% 
Uncertain
% 
Agree 
% 
Mean Disagree
% 
Uncertain
% 
Agree 
% 
Mean Disagree
% 
Uncertain
% 
Agree 
% 
Mean
Substantially improved the attitude of 
the staff 7 13 80 3.89 8 12 80 3.92 - 14 86 4.00 
Enabled clear lines of Responsibility to 
be identified within the organisation 4 9 87 4.09 - 20 80 4.04 - 21 79 4.07 
Improved the process of Accountability 
within the agency - 6 94 4.27 - 12 88 4.20 7 - 93 4.14 
Improved the process of Accountability 
between the agency and the parent 
ministry 
2 11 87 4.13 - 12 88 4.12 - - - - 
Increased the awareness of Value for 
Money amongst managers 6 26 68 3.83 - 16 84 4.08 - 21 79 4.07 
Improved the quality of  Accounting 
Information - 16 86 4.11 - 4 96 4.28 - 7 93 4.29 
Improved strategic planning 2 20 78 3.98 - 8 92 4.20 - 14 86 4.07 
Improved operational planning 2 15 83 4.09 - 8 92 4.16 - 14 86 4.21 
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TABLE V 
 
NPFM Reforms by Competitive Environment 
 
 Mainly Competitive (N=8) Partially Competitive (N=34) Non Competitive (N=38) 
Financial management reform programs 
have: 
Disagree
% 
Uncertain
% 
Agree 
% 
Mean Disagree
% 
Uncertain
% 
Agree 
% 
Mean Disagree
% 
Uncertain
% 
Agree 
% 
Mean
Substantially improved the attitude of 
the staff - - 100 4.13 12 15 73 3.88 5 14 81 3.86 
Enabled clear lines of Responsibility to 
be identified within the organisation - - 100 4.38 - 12 88 4.15 5 16 79 3.95 
Improved the process of Accountability 
within the agency - - 100 4.38 - 12 88 4.21 - 5 95 4.25 
Improved the process of Accountability 
between the agency and the parent 
ministry 
- - 100 4.25 3 18 79 4.06 - 8 92 4.16 
Increased the awareness of Value for 
Money amongst managers - 25 75 4.00 3 21 76 3.97 6 24 70 3.84 
Improved the quality of  Accounting 
Information - - 100 4.25 - 12 88 4.21 - 16 84 4.11 
Improved strategic planning - - 100 4.25 - 18 82 4.09 3 18 79 3.97 
Improved operational planning - - 100 4.25 - 18 82 4.09 3 11 86 4.11 
 
 
